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Judicial Review of Administrative Proceedings,
A Functional Prospectus:
MAURICE

H.

MERRILL*

(Continued from August Issue)
There are occasional instances in which an administrative body,
formulating policy 78 or exercising power traditionally involving merely
the common man's faculties of observation and judgment, 79 as in the
assessment of taxes,80 may be free to act without evidence. Usually,
however, the right to a hearing connotes an opportunity to support one's
position, so far as it depends upon matters of fact, "by proof, however
informal." ' Some judicial policing of this realm of administrative procedure is indicated by experience. Unfortunately, we have with us the
administrator who refuses to listen to evidence, 8 2 or who will not even
permit it to be offered, 3 or who denies the opposing party the right of
cross-examination. s There can be no quarrel with the exercise of judicial power to relieve against such arbitrary conduct, even at the expense
of some delay in the final effectiveness of the administrative process.
The difficult question of what rules of evidence should be applied
in administrative trials has received thorough examination elsewhere. It
would be presumptuous to review it in detail here. There exists a wide
Reprinted by permission, from the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW, March, 1944.
*Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma, formerly Professor of Law, University of Nebraska, and Editor of the NEBRASKA LAW BULLETIN.
'Hewitt's Appeal, 76 Conn. 685, 58 A. 231 (1904) (granting liquor license)
United States v. Douglass, 8 Mackey 99 (Dist. Col. 1890) (same) ; State v. Cooney,
102 Mont. 521, 59 P. (2d) 48 (1936) (maintenance of high school); Dodd v.
Francisco, 63 N. J. 490, 53 A. 219 (Sup. Ct. 1902) (location of cemetery).
"Doenbecher Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 95 F. (2d) 296
(C. C. A. 9th, 1938) (reasonable salary).
'Olympia Water Works v. Gelbach, 16 Wash. 482, 48 P. 251 (1897).

'Per Moody, J., cited supra note 43.
'Central Ohio Lines v. Public Utilities Commission, 123 Ohio St. 221, 174
N.E. 765 (1931).
'Narragansett Racing Assn. v. Kiernan, 59 R. I. 90, 194 A. 692 (1937). Candor compels the admission that this fault may be found in judicial proceedings as well,
necessitating a similar corrective. Smiley v. Oakland Circuit Judge, 235 Mich. 151, 209
N. W.'191 (1926); Moorev. State, 118 Ohio St. 487, 161 N.E. 532 (1928).
"Ott v. Board of Registration in Medicine, 276 Mass. 566, 177 N. E. 542
(1931).
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variety of opinion" and of practice. SG On the whole, I am inclined to
the view that the most satisfactory results can be reached through judicial acceptance of the standard of "convincing evidence,'81 such as
"responsible persons are accustomed to rely [upon] in serious affairs,""8
as the test of what these tribunals may admit and use. Necessarily, in
the application of this standard, some variations in ruling will have to
be made according to the character and the functions of particular administrative bodies and the nature of individual cases. However, it
should not be too difficult to work out certain rules which might be
made generally applicable and enforcible by judicial supervision. 8 9
Unlikely to provoke dissent, I should think, is the well-established
jurisdiction to examine the information-gathering expeditions of the
administrators to prevent infractions of the constitutional safeguards
against self-incrimination and unreasonable searches and seizures or to
compel adherence to the restrictions set by statutory authority. 0 This
accords with our traditional method of securing such interests. The
power must be exercised with that wise restraint and vigilant apprehension of all the factors involved"' that characterizes our best judicial
technique in dealing with issues of public law 9 2 but it is indispensable
to our method of securing individual rights under statutes and constitu"'See WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, §4b (3d ed. 1940): STEPHENS, ADMINISTRATIVE
TRIBUNALS AND THE RULES OF EVIDENCE, Ch. VII (1933) ; Stephan, The Extent
to Which Fact Finding Boards Should Be Bound by Rules of Evidence, 24 A. B. A. J.
630 (1938) ; Seymour, The Professor Soliloquizes on Fact Finding Boards and the
Rules of Evidence, 24 A. B. A. J. 891 (1938) ; Davis, An Approach to Problems of
Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364 (1942).
BSee WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, §4c (3d ed. 1940); STEPHENS, ADMINISTRATIVE
TRIBUNALS AND THE RULES OF EVIDENCE, Cbs. I-VI (1933): Ross, Applicability
of Common Law Rules of Evidence Before Workmen's Compensation Commissions,
36 HARV. L. REV. 263 (1923). Of course, the freedom from the requirement of a
hearing at all in rule-making proceedings [see footnote 53, supra] allows complete informality as to rules of evidence in such hearings as mav be accorded. Opp Cotton Mills
v. Administrator of Wages and Hours, 312 U. S. 126, 85 L. ed. 624, 61 S. Ct. 524
(1941); Highland Farms Dairy v. Agnew, 16 F. Supp. 575 (E. D. Va. 1936).
'See International Assn. v. National Labor Relations Board, 71 App. D. C. 175,
110 F. (2d) 29 (1939).
'See National Labor Relations Board v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F. (2d) 862

(C. C. A. 2d, 1938).
'I have made some suggestions along this line, though primarily with reference to
the practice in one state, in an article entitled Rules of Evidence in Administrative Proceedings, 14 OKLA. B. A. J. 1934 (1943).
'Harriman v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 211 U. S. 407, 53 L. ed. 253,
29 S. Ct. 115 (1908): Federal Trade Commission v. American Tobacco Co., 264
U. S. 298, 68 L. ed. 696, 44S. Ct. 336 (1924).
'See the discussion of Jones v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 298 U. S. 1,
80 L. ed. 1015, 56 S. Ct. 654 (1936), in LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS,
136-140 (1938) and cf. Securities and Exchange Commission v. Hoover, 25 F. Supp.
484 (N. D. Ill. 1938) ; Daugherty v. Superior Court, 23 Calif. A. (2d) 739, 74 P.
(2d) 549 (1937).
°Newfield v. Ryan. 91 F. (2d) 700 (C. C. A. 5th. 1936), [cert. den. Ryan v.
Newfield. 302 U. S. 729. 82 L. ed. 563, 58 S. Ct. 54 (1937)]: Bartlett-Frazier Co.
v. Hyde. 65 F. (2d) 350 (C. C. A. 7th, 1933); [cert. den. Bartlett-Frazier Co. v.
Wallace, 290 U. S. 654, 78 L. ed. 567, 54 S. Ct. 70 (1933)].
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tions, a method the propriety of which, for reasons I suggest later, does
not seem open for discussion in an investigation of this kind.
A question frequently before the courts has been how far the administrative boards may go in taking account of matters not in the record
as a basis for their decisions. Obviously, one would feel, the tribunal
is not justified in jumping to conclusions, without any supporting information.9 Similarly, even were there no due process clauses in our constitutions, I think there can be no doubt that we should deem it essential to
fair play that the commissions should be restrained from relying upon
information which they have gleaned through the reports of subordinates upon ex parte investigations not made available to the other side,1
or from scientific works or periodicals not called to the other's attention15 or from the voluminous files of the boards themselves under similar conditions.96 The objection to such procedure is twofold: the opponent has no opportunity to refute or to explain the matter to which the
administrative resorts 97 and, if it is not placed in the record, an effective
judicial review of the order is precluded by the court's inability to ascertain the basis of judgment.9 8 The possibilities for arbitrary edict or uninformed justice lurking in such a situation are obvious.
The points made against judicial insistence upon including this
foundation material in the record are that, so far as such material consists
of reports made to the administrative by parties to the proceeding, explanation or rebuttal is unnecessary since the reports should speak the
truth,9 9 that it is impossible to know in advance just what data will be
found necessary, and that subsequent introduction and opportunity for
refutation produce delay and inefficiency in the administrative process.10 °
'Oklahoma Tax Commission v. First National Bank td Trust Co., 178 Okla. 260,
62P. (2d) 1220 (1936).
.Farmers' Elev. Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 266 Ill. 567, 107 N. E. 841
(1915) ; McAlester Gas & Coke Co. v. Corporation Commission, 102 Okla 118, 227
P. 83 (1924). This tendency must be guarded against in the judiciary, also. Recent
examples include Carter v. Kubler, -U.
S. -,
88 L. ed. adv. op. 13, 64 S. Ct. adv.
sh. 1 (1943): Bestel v. Bestel. 153 Ore. 100, 53 P. (2d) 525 (1936).
'Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 301 U. S. 292, 81 L. ed.
1093, 57 S. Ct. 724 (1937).
"United States v. Abilene & So. Ry., 265 U. S. 274, 68 L. ed. 1016, 44 S. Ct.
565 (1924): Oklahoma Nat. Gas Co. v. Corporation Commission, 90 Okla. 84, 216

P.917 (1923).
t

Farmers' Elev. Co. v. Chicago, R. I. t&P. Ry., 266 Il1. 567, 107 N. E. 841

(1915).

"United States v. Abilene f3 So. Ry., 265 U. S. 274, 68 L. ed. 1016, 44 S. Ct.
565 (1924) ; McKay v. State Board of Medical Examiners. 103-Colo. 305, 86 P.
(2d) 232 (1938); Atchison T. Z4 S. F. Ry. v. State, 72 Okla. 271, 180 P. 849
(1919). This, of course, is inapplicable to a review afforded in an independent proceeding, not based on the record before the administrative tribunal. See Ohio Bell Tel.
Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, supra note 95.
"See IHanft, Utilities Commissions as Expert Courts, 15 N. C. L. REV. 12, 30
(1936).
10lbid., 35.
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These objections seem lacking in substance. Reports made in the utmost
good faith may need correction or may call for explanation in the light
of particular circumstances. Parties are in no sense responsible for material gathered from extrinsic sources and the opportunity for rebuttal
is indispensable to assured justice. Efficient judicial review may be had
only if the court has access to the stuff from which decision was formed.
Important as are celerity and efficiency, they should not be achieved at
the expense of essential justice and the incentive to careful administration afforded by an intelligent corrective process.' 0' The cases disclose
frequent resort by the commissions to these extrinsic materials. Judicial
review of their action may well find one of its most useful functions in
restricting so dangerous a practice.
The burden cast upon the administrative machinery by forbidding
these excursions outside the record may be minimized in various ways.
In many instances it should be possible to substitute written proof, often
in the form of concise summaries, for the extensive presentation of oral
evidence, 10 2 or to permit the commission's data to be set out in tentative
findings with an opportunity for the submission of proof in rebuttal. 03
The problem of drawing upon information gained in other proceedings,
which has given the courts so much trouble, 10 4 might be solved by incorporating summaries of such information in the record, accompanied
by specific citations to the original sources. In special instances, the cemmission might be permitted to rely upon knowledge acquired in another
case, closely related in time, substance and parties, simply by a reference
'As to the necessity of an adequate record to such corrective review, see Cardozo,
J., in West Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 294 U. S. 63. 79 L. ad. 761.
55 S. Ct. 316 (1935).

'See the suggestions in Gerkin, How to Shorten Rate Procedure, 17 PUBLIC
UTILITIES FORTNIGHTLY, 177 (1936) ; BROWN, Public Service Commission Procedure-A Problem and a Suggestion, 87 U. PA. L. REV. 139, 159 (1938).
'See Hanft, Utilities Commissions as Expert Courts, 15 N. C. L. REV. 12, 35
(1936). Cf. Carter v. Kubler, -U.
S. -,
88 L. ed. adv. op. 13, 64 S. Ct. adv. sh.
1 (1943); Steamboat Canal Co. v. Garson, 43 Nev. 298, 185 P. 801 (1919);
Heaney v. McGoldrick, 286 N. Y. 38, 35 N. E. (2d) 641 (1941).
'Cf. City of Elizabeth v. Board of Public Utility Commissioners, 99 N. J. L.
496, 123 A. 358 (Err. 4 A. 1924) (commission permitted to check inventory and
appraisal by experience gained in other proceedings) ; McCarthy v. Industrial Commission, 194 Wis. 198, 215 N. W. 824 (1927)
(commission permitted to disregard
expert testimony as to cause of hernia because at variance with knowledge gained from
prior cases) with Johnson v. Industrial Accident Commission, 11 Calif. A. (2d) 672,
54 P. (2d) 485 (1936) (commission not permitted to override expert testimony by
its own experience in hernia cases) ; Los Angeles EdS. L. R. R. v. Public Utilities Commission, 81 Utah 286, 17 P. (2d) 287 (1932) (commission not allowed to rely on
evidence as to nature of region involved in a former proceeding) . In Garrity v. District
of Columbia, 66 App. D. C. 256, 86 F. (2d) 207 (1936) a zoning commission's

refusal to hear evidence as to the merits of a particular type of zoning on the ground
that it had already "a world of testimony about that subject" was upheld, in an opinion
by Stephens, J., on the ground that the commission was not "bound by the rules applicable to court hearings."
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thereto. 10 5 A tribunal composed of technical experts should be allowed
to bring their specialized learning into play by stating the conclusions
to which it leads and the foundations upon which it rests. 108 In all cases,
of course, there should be full disclosure to the party affected, and an
opportunity to attempt a refutation if he desires. A possible exception
to the duty of disclosure, suggested by the decision of the Supreme Court
of the United States in Tang Tun v. Edsell,'° 7 might be allowed where
the administrative tribunal resorts to matters appearing in its records
tending merely to corroborate evidence already called to the attention of
the party affected. However, since this would increase the difficulty of
administering the rule -without any very substantial advantage to the administrators, I am inclined to regard it with disfavor.
In a variety of other forms, judicial control over matters of administrative procedure has come to the fore in recent years. The requirement
that the basic facts upon which administrative adjudicatory action is
taken be found, 0 8 an invaluable aid to the performance of the judicial
task of determining whether the commission has kept within the bounds
set by the legislature, 1°9 is becoming, by judicial interpretation, one of
the essential components of due process of law. 110 This seems to impose
no serious burden upon the process of administration. A little care in
draftsmanship will make the orders safe from attack, even in a tribunal
possessed of the very commendable opinion that findings should be more
0
" 'Cf. Pennsylvania R. R. v. United States, 40 F. (2d) 921 (W. D. Pa. 1930).
But cf. Los Angeles U S. L. R. R. v. Public Utilities Commission. 81 Utah 286, 17 P.
(2d) 287 (1932).
'Cf. McKay v. State Board of Examiners, 103 Colo. 305, 86 P. (2d) 232
(1938), holding that, in a proceeding for revocation of a physician's license for malpractice, tried by a professional board subject to judicial review by certiorari, there must
be expert testimony as to the demands of proper practice. Young, J., said, "Obviously
the reviewing court cannot be left to speculate on what was in the minds of the individual board members as constituting proper diagnosis or treatment."
The language
suggests the possibility of a different result had the board presented the reasons for its
judgment by a statement in the record.
'07223 U. S. 673, 56 L. ed. 606, 32 S. Ct. 359 (1912). See discussion in VAN

VLECK, THE ADMINISTRATIVE. CONTROL OF ALIENS, 168

(1932).

'Wichita R. R. F4Lt. Co. v. Public Utilities Com., 260 U. S. 48, 67 L. ed. 124,
43 S. Ct. 51 (1922).
'Cf. Baltimore t. 0. R. R. v. United States. 22 F. Supp. 533 (N. D. N. Y.
1937) ; Elite Dairy Products, Inc. v. Ten Eyck, 271 N. Y. 488, 3 N. E. (2d) 606
(1936); Tillotson v. City Council of Cranston, 61 R. 1. 293, 200 A. 767 (1938).
"Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388, 79 L. ed. 446, 55 S. Ct. 241
(1935). While the case just cited involved an exercise of the rule-making power, seems
definitely inconsistent with Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U. S. 176,
80 L. ed. 138, 56 S. Ct. 159 (1935), and likely may not represent the law of today.
as suggested by the note in 146 A. L. R. 209. 212 (1943), the rule for which it stands
seems peculiarly fitted to proceedings involving adjudication against specific respondents.
Such cases as Phelps-Dodge Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 313 U. S. 177.
85 L. ed. 1271, 61 S. Ct. 845 (1941), go far toward recognizing it as so essential to
the proper exercise of the function of judicial review 'as to justify treating it as a necessary part of due process of law.
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than formal recitations couched in the terms of the statute conferring
authority on the commission."'

Another field for judicial review of administrative procedure is
opened up by the decision in the first Morgan case. 1 12 Its fundamental
doctrine is well expressed in the Chief Justice's terse statement that "he
who decides must hear." Closely safeguarded as the opinion is by denial
of any intent to forbid the conduct of inquiry and the analysis of evidence by subordinates, and leaving the door open for even the delegation
of the authority to decide in a proper case," 3 it seems to establish an
eminently desirable safeguard against the possibility of uninformed or
ill-considered action. No doubt the scope of oversight over the hearing
may be carried farther with profit, as in the concept of a right to a "fair
hearing" in immigration and deportation proceedings" 4 and in the insistence that all relevant evidence be considered (although not necessarily
followed) in arriving at a decision. 1 5 Care must be observed, however,
to protect this salutary supervision, insuring standards of fair conduit
in the hearing, from such application as would supplant trial by the administrator with trial by the court. 116 A striking example of such unwarranted supervision seems to be afforded by a decision invalidating an
award of workmen's compensation because the trier of fact, confronted
with an injury not satisfactorily explained by the testimony, in his
search after truth
procured the expert whose evidence afforded a ground
1 7
for decision.
JUDICIAL REVIEW AS TO MATTERS OF SUBSTANCE

When we turn from the exercise of review over procedural determinations of administrative tribunals to control over their decrees in
respect to matters of substance, we encounter the age-old distinction
between law and fact. Since the interpretation and the application of
law is traditionally the task of the judges, we should concede their right
.to determine the legal propriety of administrative action with little question. "1 8 The occasion for the exercise of this supervision may arise from
"Missouri Broadcasting Corp. v. Federal Communications Com., 68 App. D. C.
154, 94 F. (2d) 623 (1938).
"Morgan v. United States, 298 U. S. 468, 80 L. ed. 1288, 56 S. Ct. 906
(1936).
"But consult State Tax Com. v. Katsis, 90 Utah 406, 62 P. (2d) 120, 107
A. L. R. 1477 (1936) for an improper delegation of decision.
...
See VAN VLECK.

TIE ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL

OF ALIENS,

159-170

(1932).
"'Lloyd Sabaudo Societa Anonima Per Azioni v. Elting, 287 U. S..329, 77 L.

ed. 341, 52 S. Ct. 167 (1932).

"'United States v. Morgan, 313 U. S. 409, 85 L. ed. 1429, 61 S. Ct. 999
(1941).
"'Deadwyler v. Consolidated Paper Co., 260 Mich. 130, 244 N. W. 484
(1932). Cf. National Labor Relations Board v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F. (2d)
862 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938).
"'See the discussion by Blatchford, J., in Chicago, M. V St. P. Ry. v. Minnesota,
134 U. S.418, 33 L. ed. 970, 10S. Ct. 462 (1890).
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a claim that the administrative order is in violation of constitutional
provisions, or that it goes beyond the jurisdiction prescribed by statute
for the tribunal or that it proceeds upon an erroneous view of controlling
legal principles. 119
Over review as to constitutionality we need not linger long. It is
merely an application to administrative tribunals of our general theory
of a government limited by constitutional provisions interpreted and
applied by the courts. 120 The vices and the virtues which it displays in
operation are those common to our whole system of constitutional law.
While I suggested at the outset that we ought not to confine our appraisal of judicial review to the bounds prescribed by the Constitution
as it is presently phrased and interpreted, I do not feel that we should
open the door to what Alexander Pope called a fools' contest over the
respective merits of various forms of government. Our own system
presents a method of dealing with the vexing problem of adjusting the
claims of individual liberty with the needs of governmental authority
which is familiar, indigenous and suited to our needs. 1 2 ' We are content
therewith. Of it, judicial review over administrative action with regard
to its constitutionality is and should continue to be an essential part,
subject only to such limitations as are applicable to the judicial process in
constitutional cases generally.
Questions of law .relating to "jurisdiction," that is, to the conditions precedent to the authority of the administrative tribunal to act at
all, and those relating to the extent to which it may exercise its powers,
may be grouped together for our purposes. These present the opportunity for one of the most useful applications of judicial review over executive boards. A few examples will illustrate the point. A workmen's
compensation commission may assume jurisdiction over an employment
not covered by the act. 12 2 A public utilities commission may attempt
regulation of a calling which the legislature has not subjected to its
supervision."' A motion picture censor may expand a statutory standard of "immorality" to include heretical economic or political views.12
A liquor commission may interpret an authority to prescribe rules for
law enforcement so broadly as to subject a social club to excessive and
unwelcome intrusion by the local police."' 5 A zoning board may con"'Cf. the statement of Lamar, J., in Interstate Commerce Com. v. Union Pac.
R. R., 222 U. S. 541, 56 L. ed. 308, 32 S. Ct. 108 (1912).
'"See the statement by Hughes. C. J., in St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United
States, 298 U. S. 38, 80 L. ed. 1033, 56 S. Ct. 720 (1936).
"'This is one of the most effective and least offensive of the means which have
been devised for securing the liberties and privileges that the people have reserved, in
their constitution of government, from legislative encroachment." Manning, J., in
Walker v. Griffith, 60 Ala. 361 (1877).
'Slick v. Boyett, 160 Okla. 111, 16 P. (2d) 237 (1932).
'In re Milo Water Co., 128 Me. 531, 149 A. 299 (1930).
"Schuman v. Pickert, 277 Mich. 225, 269 N. W. 152 (1936).
" Manchester Press Club v. State Liquor Comm.. 89 N. H. 442, 200 A. 407
(1938).
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strue its power to permit nonconforming uses on the ground of unnecessary hardship too broadly, to the detriment of neighboring owners. 121 In
cases of this sort, effective relief may be obtained through the power of
the courts to review the administrative determinations of law.
The chief other function of review for mistake of law rests upon
the foundation furnished by the theory that an order made without
supporting evidence is erroneous in law. 127 It is a potent weapon of control over those unfortunate proceedings sporadically occurring wherein
a truly arbitrary use of power is involved." It is useful also as an auxiliary defense against mistaken assumptions of ungranted power.
The occasions for invoking redress upon these grounds are myriad,
as even a casual examination of the books attests. It is natural that
boards entrusted with the achievement of policy should seek to utilize
their powers to the utmost. 1 29 Often untrained in the law, their mem-

bers are not in the best position to arrive at an acute and unbiased decision as against those who deny their authority. Pressed with the need
for prompt disposition of numerous issues, they tend naturally to entertain few doubts concerning the legal propriety of desired ends and to
s
resolve all such incertitude in favor of what seems the expedient course. 130
This is just what, in the interest of efficient governance, they should do.
But exactly because of these characteristics of the administrative action,
there arises the need for an effective check in the form of a review upon
questions of law. The judges, by training, by experience and by professional tradition, are fitted to correct precisely the deficiencies we have
enumerated as likely to warp the administrator's estimate of his own
legal power. Accustomed to weighing issues, to listening to both sides,
to considering the various factors affecting any decision, and specializing
in the determination of legal questions, they provide a tribunal before
which the clashing claims of administration and of citizen may be well
adjusted. No doubt some lost motion, some reduction in administrative
efficiency, may result, but the gain in protection against the exercise of
ungranted power clearly outweighs these disadvantages.
Nonetheless, there must be a discriminating wisdom in the exercise
of judicial review of this sort. There is much justice in the complaint
that reviewing judges often construe administrative powers with an unsympathetic bias,'3' to the detriment of the proper performance of ad'Thayer v. Board of Appeals, 114 Conn. 15, 187 A. 273. (1931).
"aThe Chicago Junction Case, 264 U. S. 252, 68 L. ed. 667, 44 S. Ct. 317
(1924).

(2cf. Narragansett Racing Assn. v. Kiernan,
59 R. I. 79, 194 A. 49 (1937).
"'An official or an administrative authority is almost as likely to stretch the law
against an individual as is a private person concerned with his own welfare." Jennings,
Courts and Administrative Law, 48 HARV. L. REV. 426, 454 (1936).
'For a late example, see Recent Case, 52 HARV. L. REV. 694 (1939).
'See Laski, Judicial Review of Social Policy in England, 39 HARV. L. REV. 832
(1926) : Jennings, Courts and Administrative Law, 49 HARV. L. REV. 426 (1936).
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ministrative duties." 2 The judge must bear in mind that the administrator has a legislative commission to enforce a desired policy and that
professional nostalgia for the repudiated system of the common law 1 3
has no place in the exercise of judicial review. Only by free acceptance
of the legislative directions as to the course to be followed, confining
judicial supervision to the enforcement of the plain limitations of constitutions and statutes and to the annullment of arbitrary acts, may that
supervision be made a legitimate component of modern administrative
law.
Issues of fact present a different problem in court review of administrative action than do issues of law. Celerity, vigor, expert judgment,
sympathetic interpretation, and all the other special values we seek to
promote through the use of administrative tribunals, are subverted by
throwing open the door to wholesale reconsideration of all sorts of fact
issues. Despite some feeling that review of administrative findings of
fact should involve as full a re-examination of he evidence as, for instance, an equity appeal,1 3 4 I think we must approve the generally existing practice of refusing so extensive a review 1"5 and confining the court's
sphere to deciding the "question of law" whether there is evidence sustaining the administrative finding. 13 6 Not only does too broad a revisory
jurisdiction bethrall the administrative commissions: it overwhelms the
courts. 1 3 The analogy to review in equity or in admiralty fails because
the reviewing tribunal has no community of function, of experience, or
of jurisdiction with the bodies whose determinations it is to scrutinize.
Only,paralysis, discrimination, and error can result from the exercise of
so far-reaching a review of the facts.
More plausible is the contention that there should be an "independent judgment" by the courts "as to both law and facts" where the fact
determination is decisive of issues of constitutional right. 1 3 The argumeant in its favor is nowhere better put than in the opinion by Mr. Chief
3
" Cf. McFarland, Judicial Control of the Federal Trade Commission, 1920-1930,
47, 110 (1936): Hale, The "Fair Value" Merry-Go-Round, 1898-1938, 33 ILL. L.
REV. 517 (1939).
'See Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383 (1908).
An example of this professional nostalgia appears in the complaint against commissions
that they do not apply the ancient rules. See Boyd, The Court System Contrasted
With the Bureau System, 24 IOWA L. REV. (Bar Association Section) 25, 28 (1938).
"'See Vanderbilt, The Bar and the Public, 62 A. B. A. REP. 464, 470 (1937).
'There are a few instances, where administrative action is taken summarily and
without hearing or the preservation of a record, in which, if there is to be judicial
review, inevitably it must extend to all relevant facts. See Dickinson, Judicial Control
of Official Discretion, 22 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 275 (1928).
'St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 38, 80 L. ed. 1033, 56
S.Ct. 720 (1936).
'..See McGuire, A Government of Laws or a Government of Men, 13 IND. L. J.
433, 447-451 (1938).
'Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S. 287, 64 L. ed. 9018,
40 S. Ct. 527 (1920). But cf. United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U. S. 253, 49 L. ed.
1040, 25 S. Ct. 644 (1905).
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Justice Hughes in the St. Joseph Stock Yards case. 1s3 He suggests to
us the ease wherewith astute administrators might evade constitutional
limitations by findings based upon tenuous evidence, and emphasizes
the magnitude of this threat to limited government in the face of the
rapid multiplication of administrative agencies. The opposite position
is set forth in the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis, which
stresses the impotence, the delay, and the irresponsibility imposed on
the administrative process by the review of fact issues even in matters
of constitutionality and the extreme congestion of the court's dockets
involved in the general exercise of such jurisdiction.
Each argument presented the claims of values essential to a proper
development of our public law. Neither spoke in absolute terms. The
Chief Justice sought to avoid undue interference with administrative
functions by imposing a heavy burden of proof upon the complainant
and by according great deference to the executive finding.. Mr. Justice
Brandeis wished to preserve constitutional rights against administrative
subversion through the exercise of judicial review, if "the regulating
body has, in reaching its conclusions, ignored established principles or
incontestable facts, or been guilty of dishonesty or of other irregularity
in the proceeding.'" 14 0 Hence there is little difference in the ends sought;
the distinction lies chiefly in means and in emphasis. Choice is difficult
when the factors are so evenly balanced. Upon the whole, there seems a
slight advantage in the Brandeis approach. In its emphasis upon mistake
of principle, arbitrary judgment, or insincerity as the bases for review,
it seems more likely to focus attention upon the need for real grievance,
discouraging the development of routine resort to the courts by every
discontented party with its accompanying threat of palsy to the administration and congestion to the judiciary. It may be significant that the
course of decision in the Supreme Court evinces a tendency against fully
logical application of the rule laid down by Chief Justice Hughes. 141
Novo
The plethora of methods available for invoking judicial review
over administrative action 142 for the most part creates no problem within
THE TECHNIQUE OF REVIEW-TRIAL DE

" St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 38, 80 L. ed. 1033, 56
S. Ct. 720 (1936).
...
See concurring opinion by Brandeis, J., in St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United
States, supra, note 125. The learned justice quotes repeatedly the phraseology of
Holmes, J., in San Diego Land VJTown Co. v. Jasper, 189 U. S. 439, 47 L. ed. 892,
23 S. Ct. 571 (1903) that the test is whether "it was impossible for a fair-minded
board to come to the result which was reached."
..E. g., the rule seems disregarded in Voehl v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 288 U. S. 162.
77 L. ed. 676, 53 S. Ct. 380 (19'33) and Washington, Va. &' Md. Coach Co. v.
National Labor Relations Board, 301 U. S. 142, 81 L. ed. 965, 57 S. Ct. 648
(1937). See also Davis, Emasculation of Administrative Action and Oil Proration, 19
TEX. L. REV. 29, 58 (1940).
"'See Stason, Methods of Judicial Relief from Administrative Action, 24 A. B. A.
J. 274 (1938).
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the scope of our subject. One, however, merits our consideration: Shall
the review be upon the record before the administrator or shall there be
a trial de novo before the reviewing court?
In some instances the summarily rudimentary nature of the administrative process leaves no choice. Thus where a health officer destroys
property thought to be so'infected as to be a source of danger to the
general well-being, the want of a formal hearing and its consequent
record necessitates that the issues be determined on the basis of new
evidence before the court in which his action is challenged. 143 The same
need occurs where the attack is upon a general regulation issued without
full hearing. 144 But by the great majority of our highly developed modern tribunals, action is taken only after a formal trial, producing an
elaborate record which may serve as the basis for judicial review. Except
as to so-called "jurisdictional" or "constitutional" facts, 141 there is no
question that this record constitutionally may be made the sole basis for
review. 146 Ought it to be?
The argument in favor of de nooo trial stresses a suppositious superiority of the record in judicial proceedings over that made before a
board; 147 "the difference in security of judicial over administrative action, '148 arising, perhaps, from the employment of common law rules
of evidence 49 or from the superintending function of the judge;1 50 and
the ease with which "some" evidence may be contrived to support the
administrative finding.' 5 ' These factors, in the last analysis all coming
down to the effectiveness with which judicial supervision may be exercised, do not seem conclusive. There is no good reason why review
upon the administrative record may not be made equally efficient to that
resulting from de novo hearing. To preserve an adequate record is the
lawyer's business and he can be as diligent in it before a board as before
a court. ' 2 Common law evidential rules do not afford the sole guarantee
"True, whether the issue is as to the correctness of the officer's act, Lowe v. Conroy, 120 Wis. 151, 97 N. W. 942, 66 L. R. A. 907, 102 A. S. R. 983 (1904), or
as to his good faith, Raymond v. Fish, 51 Conn. 80 (1883).
"..See Health Department v. Trinity Church. 145 N. Y. 32, 39 N. E. 833, 45
Am. St. Rep. 579 (1895).
... Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22. 76 L. ed. 598, 52 S. Ct. 285 (1932)
Baltimore ZdOhio R. R. v. United States, 298 U. S. 349, 80 L. ed. 1209, 56 S. Ct.

797 (1936).
...Crowellv. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 76 L. ed. 598, 52 S. Ct. 285 (1932).

...
See Burgess, Recent Efforts to Immunize Commission Orders Against Judicial

Review, 16 IOWA L. REV. 58, 58 (1930).
...NgFung Ho v. White, 259 U. S. 285, 66 L. ed. 943, 42 S. Ct. 492 (1922).
'United States v. Woo Jan, 245 U. S.552, 62 L. ed. 466, 38 S.Ct. 207
(1918).
"Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S.22, 76 L. ed. 598, 52 S. Ct. 285 (1932).
'Chicago, B. V3Q. R. R. v. Osborne, 265 U. S. 14, 68 L. ed. 878, 44 S. Ct.
431 (1924).

"See Merrill, Recent Efforts to Immunize Commission Orders Against Judicial
Review: A Reply, 16 IOWA L. REV. 62. 69 (1930).

DICTA

227

of reliability. 153 The superintending judicial function may find application in review upon the record as effectively as in trial de novo.'1 4 Tenuous evidence, as we have seen, may be sterilized by a record so convincing
as to present a clear instance of insincere decision. Hence de novo trial
does not seem an indispensable safeguard against arbitrary acts.
Against the relatively minor benefits of the de novo review are to
be set serious disadvantages. The double hearing wastes time, energy
and money. 155 Experience shows that parties commonly withhold testimony from the administrative hearing to produce it at the judicial
trial, 156 an unfair practice which renders the administrative procedure a
useless farce. De novo trials, if commonly employed, would so clutter
the judicial dockets that a thoughtful student of administrative law
rightly has termed the notion of such use "fantastic." 5 7 Judges, moreover, do not possess those unique facilities for investigation and that
specialized expertness which have been named as peculiar virtues of the
administrative tribunal. De novo trial tends to futilize the employment
of these advantageous tools. These objections apply just as strongly to
the determination of issues of "jurisdictional" or "constitutional" fact
as to other issues. 158 Accordingly, it is suggested that, viewing the problem in the light of governmental expediency, dissociated from existing
decisions, the de novo trial of fact issues of any sort in the review of
administrative action, taken after an adequate hearing, should be abandoned.
CONCLUSIONS

By way of summary, it may be suggested that our'survey has disclosed a most useful field for judicial review of administrative action in
the oversight of procedure. The enforcement of procedural amenities
offers one of the most effective means of safeguard against the perils of
a possibly arbitrary bureaucracy. Similarly, judicial review in matters
of law may be employed with advantage to restrain the executive tribunals within the bounds of their delegated authority and to prevent
'See Stephan, The Extent to Which Fact-Finding Boards Should Be Bound by
Rules Mof Evidence, 24 A. B. A. J. 630 (1938).
' E. g., see In re Assessment of Kansas City Southern Ry., 168 Okla. 495, 33 P.
(2d) 772 (1934), same case on second appeal, 175 Okla. 444, 53 P. (2d) 536
(1936).
'See Braxton, The Virginia State Corporation Commission, 38 AM. L. REV.
480, 491 (1904); DODD, THE ADMINISTRATION OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION,
370 (1936).
"zaSee FRANIKFURTER AND LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT,
149 (1927); 1 SHARFMAN, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, 24
(1931) : DODD, loc. cit., supra note 155.
"LMcGuire, "A Little Practical Virtue Is to Be Preferred to Theory"--Control of
Administrative Responsibility, 7 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 304, 317 (1939). See also
FRANKFURTER AND LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE. SUPREME COURT, 149 (1927).
'See Dickinson, Crowell v. Benson: Judicial Review of Administrative Determination of Questions of "Constitutional Fact," 80 U. PA. L. REV. 1055 (1932).
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bizarre results based upon error or fraudulence. 159 Review upon questions of fact yields far less return in the preservation of private right
in proportion to the burden imposed upon the administrative process.
It should be employed sparingly, wisely, and with much caution.
And that last plea for cautious wisdom leads naturally to the
thought with which I would close this discussion. The problem of the
relationship between the older and the newer tribunals cannot be solved
satisfactorily upon the assumption that all administrative agencies are
composed of especially vicious members of the genus wolf, species big,
subspecies bad. It cannot be solved upon the opposite assumption that
the judges are surly dogs in the manger, petulantly guarding a jurisdiction they are unable usefully to exercise. It must be approached with a
tolerant recognitioin of the special competencies of the respective agencies,
administrative and judicial, which will assent to the exercise, by each
type of tribunal, of those functions for which it is best fitted. In such a
division of labor, the appropriate task of the courts is the preservation
of procedural decency, including fair and honest decision, and the administration of the broad standards of substantive law which hedge about
the executive domain; that of the administrators is to determine and to
execute policies, within the sphere constitutionally assigned to them by
the legislature, and to investigate and to decide the issues of fact incident
to their application. 160 To promote this adjustment should be the aim
of our administrative law.
'Stammer v. Board of Regents, 287 N. Y. 359, 39 N. E. (2d) 913 (1942)
[affg. 262 App. Div. 372, 29 N. Y. S. (2d) 38 (1941) ] affords a timely example of
the effective and politic use of judicial review for this purpose, and warns us to be slow
in urging complete abdication by courts in favor of commissions.
'"See the able discussion by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Railroad Commission v.
Rowan fl Nichols Oil Co., 311 U.S. 570, 85 L. ed. 358, 61 S. Ct. 343 (1941).

Corrections
We feel that lawyers who devote a considerable amount of time to
bar association committee work should have adequate public notice of
that fact. We, therefore, regret that two errors have recently occurred in
listing members of committees. In listing the members of the rules committee of the Colorado Supreme Court in the July issue, the name of Jean
Breitenstein should have been included as a member of the committee.
In listing the members of the Legal Aid committee of the Denver Bar
Association in the August issue, the name of Judge Charles C. Sackmann should have been included as a member of the committee.

